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The Curious Anomaly of Skewed Judgment Distributions
and Systematic Error in the Wisdom of Crowds
Ulrik W. Nash*
Strategic Organization Design, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
Abstract
Judgment distributions are often skewed and we know little about why. This paper explains the phenomenon of skewed
judgment distributions by introducing the augmented quincunx (AQ) model of sequential and probabilistic cue
categorization by neurons of judges. In the process of developing inferences about true values, when neurons categorize
cues better than chance, and when the particular true value is extreme compared to what is typical and anchored upon,
then populations of judges form skewed judgment distributions with high probability. Moreover, the collective error made
by these people can be inferred from how skewed their judgment distributions are, and in what direction they tilt. This
implies not just that judgment distributions are shaped by cues, but that judgment distributions are cues themselves for the
wisdom of crowds. The AQ model also predicts that judgment variance correlates positively with collective error, thereby
challenging what is commonly believed about how diversity and collective intelligence relate. Data from 3053 judgment
surveys about US macroeconomic variables obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the Wall Street
Journal provide strong support, and implications are discussed with reference to three central ideas on collective
intelligence, these being Galton’s conjecture on the distribution of judgments, Muth’s rational expectations hypothesis, and
Page’s diversity prediction theorem.
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Introduction
We measure and navigate our environment by making intuitive
judgments, but these are fallible. By also giving weight to
judgments made by others we can diminish our mistakes. The
mean of many intuitive judgments, made by numerous different
people, is accurate when judgments scatter around the truth. In
fact, the mean is perfect when judgments scatter in symmetry
around the truth, because then all mistakes of underestimation are
matched by counterpart errors of overestimation. However, when
the weight of judgments distribute in greater proportion on either
side of the truth, the mean has error. Indeed, systematic error in
the mean of judgments exists to the extent these distributions can
be predicted. Given the trust bestowed upon popular judgment in
democratic societies, it would have considerable implication for
outcomes of decision making if such a phenomenon of predict-
ability existed, because it would imply an avoidable type of mistake
is currently being made in many domains, from the misdiagnosis
of patients by consensus seeking doctors, to the misallocation of
resources by consensus seeking managers, investors, and politi-
cians. From that perspective this paper brings bad news, because it
contains evidence of systematic error in the wisdom of crowds.
However, there is also potentially good news, because collective
error appears predictable by the way judgments observably scatter.
Judgment distributions are often curiously skewed, something
long known [1][2][3], but something we have deferred efforts to
understand. Here I argue that when people use cues to make
inferences about their environment, when people use these cues
with adeptness, and when the environment is extreme compared
to the central tendency of peoples’ prior experience, then skewed
judgment distributions occur with high probability. Moreover,
collective error can be inferred from the degree and direction of
judgment distribution skew, and from the degree of judgment
distribution variance, implying that judgment distributions are
shaped by cues, and are cues themselves for the wisdom of crowds;
decision makers can infer collective intelligence by the shape of
judgment distributions, and can moderate their confidence in
popular judgment accordingly. We can even hope to repair the
systematic error of our collective intelligence, and gain greater
knowledge about our world. One candidate procedure for doing
that is outlined in the discussion.
I base my arguments on the augmented quincunx (AQ) model
of sequential and probabilistic cue categorization by neurons of
judges. The model is introduced shortly, and I conduct tests using
3053 distributions of judgments made by economists about the US
economic system, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, and the Wall Street Journal. The AQ model finds
strong support, and I discuss what that means for three important
ideas on collective intelligence, namely Galton’s conjecture on the
distribution of judgments, which Galton stated, unbeknownst to
most, in his seminal paper on the wisdom of crowds [1], Muth’s
rational expectations hypothesis [4][5], which became the
foundation of modern economics, and Page’s diversity prediction
theorem [6], which is often cited to promote social diversity.
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The AQ Model of Judgment
Neurons that categorize and accumulate information about the
environment have been modeled with success by researchers in
order to understand the neural basis of choice [7][8]. The
cognitive mechanism studied involves competing neurons tuned to
opposing hypotheses, whose firing rates indicate their level of
confidence, and where these firing rates or levels of confidence are
accumulated by other neurons positioned further downstream to
generate an overall inference. When discrete packets of informa-
tion consistent or inconsistent with competing hypotheses arrive at
the brain, an accumulating variable is thereby created, which
breaches one of two decision thresholds after a while. These
models give researchers good reason to believe information clarity
determines the speed at which people choose A over B (or B over
A) and the amount of evidence needed to decide. But while current
models thereby advance our understanding of binary choice, they
cannot explain situations where people are required to form
refined judgments.
So let us consider an alternative model of intuitive judgment,
and let us, in the spirit of Galton’s seminal study, assume judges
are competitors trying to guess the weight of an ox at the West of
England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition.
The Problem of Discriminating
The problem faced by our judges involves discriminating
between the weight of the particular ox presented to them, T , and
the typical weight of oxen, mT , the latter being common knowledge
gained through experience.
Judges cannot measure T directly, but oxen have numerous
perceptible regions, C, correlating with T . Judges use these regions
to make inferences about how much the ox weighs. I follow
standard practice and call these regions cues, while assuming they
are stochastically independent. Regions might include, for
instance, the height of the ox, or the degree to which its ribs are
showing.
Across the population of all oxen, particular cues share the same
correlation with weight, but they have various magnitudes, with
some shoulders, say, being larger than others. The information
value of the particular cue, ic, derives from both magnitude and
correlation.
Typical cues have zero information value, while information
values in general are distributed in symmetry around this level;
particular cues contain more or less information by which to
discriminate T positively or negatively from mT . For example,
while there is a typical degree of rib visibility, the visibility for any
particular ox will be higher or lower, with more visible ribs
informing judges they face an abnormally light ox (TvmT ).
In their attempt to discriminate T from mT , judges discriminate
cues from what is typical, gathering evidence across all cues before
guessing. I call this process categorization, because cues are either
greater or smaller than their central tendency. Cues at the central
tendency are referred to as typical cues.
Categorizing Cues by Voting Neurons
The process of categorizing leads to refined judgment
(Figure 1). Consistent with models of binary choice, refined
judgment involves two neuron classes. The first class is represented
by two populations, LV and SV , which contain neurons tuned to
different regions of cues, and which respond with mean spike rates
proportional to the information presented in their preferred
region; these are voting neurons, as indicated by the chosen
subscript, while L and S indicate their preference for competing
hypotheses ‘‘larger than typical’’ and ‘‘smaller than typical’’. The
second class is represented by two counterpart neurons, LP and
SP, which receive and accumulate evidence from LV and SV
respectively; these are polling neurons. Once again the chosen
subscript indicates neuron class, while L and S again indicate
preferences for the hypotheses ‘‘larger than typical’’ and ‘‘smaller
than typical’’.
I assume that voting neurons remain unresponsive to cues
outside their preferred region, implying that for every cue there
are two active voting neurons, one in LV and one in SV . Voting
neurons in LV and SV represent the competing hypotheses icw0
and icv0 respectively, and each population reveals its level of
confidence through the firing rates of active members. For higher
values of ic, the mean spike rate across LV , denoted mLVic
, rises
linearly, while the mean spike rate across SV , denoted mSVic
, falls
by the same absolute magnitude:
mLVic
~NVzic , mSVic
~NV{ic, ð1Þ
where NV is the mean firing rate of the neuron activated by the
typical cue.
Opposing neurons in LV and SV compete using their response
to ic, with the neuron demonstrating greatest activity winning the
right to encode ic as being compatible with the hypothesis it
supports. This evidence is subsequently passed to the counterpart
polling neurons in LP and SP using the following instructions:
LVic :
zDNV{mLVic
for winj
{DNV{mLVic
for lossj
8<
:
SVic
:
zDNV{mSVic
for winj
{DNV{mSVic
for lossj
8<
:
ð2Þ
In words, when voting neurons win their competition, they
instruct their counterpart polling neuron to increase its firing rate
by an amount equal to the difference between the voting neuron’s
usual response, and the firing rate occurring under typical
circumstances. Losing has the effect of reducing firing rates by
the same magnitude.
Noise and Categorization Error
If voting neurons could respond to ic using only their mean
firing rate, then battles between voting neurons would lead to
perfect categorization because the spike rate within LV would
always surpass the spike rate within SV when icw0, while the spike
rate within SV would always surpass the spike rate within LV
when icv0. But firing rate variance introduces the possibility of
categorization error.
Variance introduces the possibility that LV displays greater
confidence even though icv0, or that SV displays greater
confidence even though icw0. In each case LP and SP are given
false instructions, implying that an error of categorization has
occurred.
Although contemporary evidence suggests that neuronal
responses are more accurately captured by the Poisson distribution
[9], for the purpose of understanding categorization error, the
Gaussian distribution has been used pragmatically since Thur-
stone’s early ideas on comparative judgment [10]. Continuing this
practice, the probability of categorization error can be understood
by following two steps: First, we subtract the distribution of firing
Systematic Error in the Wisdom of Crowds
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rates for the active neuron in LV , from the distribution of firing
rates for the competing neuron in SV , and second, we integrate
the resultant Gaussian distribution from {? to 0. This yields:
1{p~
1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
s2
r
s Erfc
m
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
s2
r
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
2
664
3
775, ð3Þ
where p denotes the probability of correct categorization, m is
the difference between the mean firing rates of active voting
neurons, and s2 is the sum of their firing rate variance.
Differentiating error equation (3) with respect to m and s reveals
that frequencies of categorization error increase with s, and
decrease with m; when voting neurons vary their firing rates more,
or when the mean firing rates are less separated, which they are
when the particular cue is typical, then the probability that LVic
Figure 1. Information categorization by neurons leading to intuitive judgment. A. The weight of an ox must be judged. This true value
cannot be observed directly, but numerous perceptible parts of the ox correlate with how much it weighs. These parts, here indicated as shoulder
and rump, are cues (C1 and C2), and their validity as indicators of weight are either larger or smaller than what is typical for such cues, with validity
relative this reference point determining their information content. B. Information categorization by voting neurons. Two populations of voting
neurons (SV and LV ) support opposing hypotheses about the true value, in the present case, that weight is larger or smaller than typical. Each
population contains neurons tuned to particular cues, so that for each cue there are two competing neurons. As visualized here by the size of
dendrites, these neurons moderate their firing rates according to how consistent information is with their supported hypothesis, with the neuron
displaying greatest activity wining the right to encode information as consistent with its preference. This information categorization process is fallible
because firing rates of voting neurons vary around their appropriate levels, as visualized here using probability distributions. C. Evidence
accumulation by polling neurons. Polling neurons (SP and LP) receive instructions from counterpart voting neurons to increase or decrease their
firing rates above normal levels (NP). More specifically, defeated voting neurons send inhibitory instructions, while winning neurons send instructions
encouraging greater activity. As streams of instructions are received, two accumulating variables are thereby established ASP and ALP . D. Intuitive
judgment. The firing rate of the most active polling neuron, in this case LP, is ultimately converted to judgment by scaling this rate using an
appropriate factor (f ). This provides an inference about the true value’s degree of extremeness (et), while subsequent addition of the typically
encountered true value, mT , provides an inference about the true value in absolute terms (eT ).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.g001
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and LVic will communicate wrong instructions to LP and SP
increases. This probability drives most predictions, as we shall see.
Accumulating Evidence by Polling Neurons
As voting neurons categorize cues, polling neurons create
evolving inferences about T . More specifically, neurons LP and SP
change their firing rates by increments equal to instructions
received from neurons in LV and SV , as summarized by
instruction equation (2). This creates two accumulating spike
rates, ALP and ASP , anchored at the level expected for T~mT ,
denoted NP, and moving up or down as instructions are received.
After all C cues have been categorized, the deviation between
max (ALP ,ASP ) and NP is proportional to how much the judge
thinks T deviates from mT . When max (ALP ,ASP ) = ALP the
deviation is proportional to how much the judge thinks T
surpasses mT , while the deviation is proportional to how much the
judge thinks T is surpassed by mT when max (ALP ,ASP ) = ASP .
Converting Spikes to Relevant Scale
Since ic is linearly related to mLVic
and mSVic
, the deviation
between T and mT can be measured on the relevant scale by
multiplying max (ALP ,ASP ) by the appropriate constant f .
Subsequent addition of mT gives the judgment about T :
eT~
z½max (ALP ,ASP ){NPfzmT formax (ALP ,ASP )~ALP
{½max (ALP ,ASP ){NPfzmT formax (ALP ,ASP )~ASP
( ð4Þ
The Truth
While judgments are probabilistic according to the model, the
true value is deterministic, and so is the true deviation between mT
and T . This value, henceforth referred to simply as extremeness,
equals the sum of information values across all cues:
t~T{mT~
XC
c~1
ic: ð5Þ
Simplifying
When many competitions at the West of England Fat Stock and
Poultry Exhibition are simulated (Code S1), skewed judgment
distributions are often seen, and we notice negative correlation
between collective error and judgment distribution skew, irrespec-
tive of us adopting the mean or the median as vox populi
(Figure 2). Categorization error plays an important role in
generating these patterns, but simplification is needed to
understand how.
Things are made easier if we introduce the following
assumptions: first, we restrict ic to the binary {1 or 1; now all
cues have identical absolute information values. Second, we set
DNV{mLVic D~1 so information, and the response to information
by voting neurons, equate in absolute terms. As corollary, f~1
because spike rates and the true value are measured on the same
scale. Third, we make p an independent and homogeneous
variable across judges to understand the effect of categorization
error in general. Finally, we focus on t rather than T , so that
examined judgments concern extremeness.
Sir Francis Galton’s [1] was the first scholar to publish ideas
about how judgment distributions obtain their particular shape,
but he admitted feeling uncertain about the answer due to his
limited knowledge of psychology. From that perspective it is quite
peculiar that distillation of the detailed model creates a quincunx,
Sir Francis Galton’s eminent probability device [11], which he
invented in 1873 to demonstrate the central limit theorem.
However, unlike Galton’s version, which shows the dispersion of
falling balls in general as they deflect past multiple rows of pins,
this particular quincunx captures the probabilistic relation
between the motion of balls in general, and the motion of an
‘‘attractor ball’’, given probabilities of the former balls following
the direction of the latter ball at every row. In this augmented
quincunx model, the path of the attractor ball captures extreme-
ness of a true value, as indicated by numerous cues (pin rows),
while the other balls together reveal the probabilistic process of
categorizing those cues to make an inference (the particular
compartment each ball settles in) (Figure 3). I have included an
application (Application S1), which the reader can use to visualize
the AQ Model and its main predictions.
Deriving the Distribution of Judgments
The distribution of judgments predicted by the AQ Model can
be derived by conducting nz independent Bernoulli trials over
cues positively associated with t, and n{ independent Bernoulli
trials over cues negatively associated with t. Let y(q,n) denote the
number of cues out of n cues that are thought to be positively
associated with t when the probability for such an opinion is q.
Every judgment equals the number of cues perceived to be
positively associated with t, minus the number of cues perceived to
be negatively associated with t, and each of these two categories
can be further divided into cues perceived correctly and cues
perceived incorrectly. Since these four numbers are constrained by
n+ the judgment is reduced to
et~y(p,nz){(nz{y(p,nz))
zy(1{p,n{){(n{{y(1{p,n{))
ð6Þ
~2y(p,nz)z2y(1{p,n{){C ð7Þ
Further constraining the two independent stochastic variables
y(p,nz) and y(1{p,n{), so they sum to a particular judgment,
yields the distribution of judgments:
Prob(et D t,C,p)~
Xmin (Czet2 ,Czt2 )
k~max (0,
etzt
2
)
Czt
2
k
 !
C{t
2
Czet
2
{k
 !
p
2k{
etzt
2 (1{p)
C{(2k{
etzt
2
)
ð8Þ
Deriving Moments of the Judgment Distribution
While the moments of judgments can be calculated from the
distribution equation (8), it is more instructive to take an
alternative view of the process by which the Bernoulli trials
unfold. Let the judge’s categorization of one particular sequence of
cues ~c be described by ~u~fuigCi~1, where each categorization
takes on values of ui~+1, where z1 indicates correct
categorization and {1 indicates incorrect categorization. Thus
Systematic Error in the Wisdom of Crowds
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the sequence of categorizations represents C independent
Bernoulli trials with the following outcomes:
u~
z1 p
with probability
{1 1{p
8><
>: ð9Þ
The judgment is simply the inner product of the cue and the
categorization vectors:
et~
XC
i~1
ciui~~c:~u ð10Þ
From here the moments and cross-moments of the atomic
variables of equation (9) are
E(u)~2p{1:U ð11Þ
E(u2)~1 ð12Þ
E(u2kz1)~E (u)~2p{1 ð13Þ
E(u2k)~E (u2)~1 ð14Þ
Var(u)~1{(2p{1)2~1{U2:V ð15Þ
Figure 2. Simulation of judgment distributions using the detailed neuronal model. Two separate batches of 10000 judgment distributions,
formed by 100 judges each, were simulated using the detailed neuronal model from which the AQ Model is distilled. Judges in the first batch were
endowed with neurons categorizing information using small firing rate variance (settings of sdLV~sdSV~10 in the MATLAB code provided as Code
S1, and referred to as ‘‘Low Noise’’), while judges in the second batch were endowed with neurons displaying high variance (settings of
sdLV~sdSV~1000, and referred to as ‘‘High Noise’’). This divergence in firing rate variance produces clear differences in judgment adeptness across
the batches, with judges endowed with Low Noise neurons making smaller errors on average than judges having High Noise neurons. This is because
in the underlying cue categorization process that generates the intuitive judgment, the neurons of these individuals make fewer errors. Moreover,
greater adeptness among judges gives rise to higher frequencies of skewed judgment distributions, and results in negative association between skew
and collective error. Why that is, however, and why true value extremeness is central to these patterns, remains unclear without the AQ model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.g002
Systematic Error in the Wisdom of Crowds
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VI(f1,2, . . . ,Cg : E Pi[Iuið Þ~Pi[I E (ui) ð16Þ
Vi=j : CoVar(u ui j)~0 ð17Þ
and moments of the judgment distribution are calculated using
these. For example, the mean judgment is derived as
E(et)~ E
XC
i~1
ciui
 !
~
XC
i~1
ciE(ui)~U
XC
i~1
ci~Ut ð18Þ
In turn, higher order raw moments can be calculated by
carefully categorizing terms according to how many indices
collide. For example, the second raw moment is derived as
E(e2t )~E
XC
i~1
ciui
 ! XC
j~1
cjuj
 ! !
ð19Þ
~E
XC
i~1
c2i u
2
iz
XC
i~1
X
j=i
cicjuiuj
 !
ð20Þ
~
XC
i~1
c2i E(u
2
i )z
XC
i~1
X
j=i
cicjE(uiuj) ð21Þ
~CzU2
XC
i~1
X
j=i
cicjzU
2
XC
i~1
X
j~i
cicj{U
2
XC
i~1
X
j~i
cicj ð22Þ
~CzU2
XC
i~1
XC
j~1
cicj{U
2C ð23Þ
~VCzU2t2 ð24Þ
noting that c2i~1. Subtracting equation (18) from equation (24),
the variance s2~VC is obtained. Following this scheme, the
mean, variance, and skew of the judgment distribution are found:
mean(et)~Ut~ (2p{1)t ð25Þ
var(et)~VC~ 4C(1{p)p ð26Þ
skew(et)~{
2Ut
C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
VC
p ~{ (2p{1)t
C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C(1{p)p
p ð27Þ
Predictions
As described under the subheadings below, the AQ model
makes four central predictions. The first prediction relates to what
Galton described as the ‘‘curious anomaly’’ of judgment distribu-
tion skew [1], with reference to his observation in Plymouth.
Prediction 1: Judgment Distributions are often Skewed
Setting skew(et)~0 and solving for t, p, and C provides the
conditions for judgment distribution symmetry. These conditions
are t~0 or p~
1
2
, while there is no solution for C. If the ox
presented at Plymouth had weighed what oxen typically did in
1906, or if judges had categorized cues arbitrarily, then according
to the AQ model, Galton would probably have observed a
symmetric judgment distribution. However, Galton reported skew
[1].
Skewed judgment distributions are predicted to occur when
p=
1
2
and t=0, and we can hypothesize that judges at Plymouth
Figure 3. Deriving the AQ Model. The AQ model can be derived
from the detailed neuronal model by assuming unit information
content of cues ({1 or 1), unit firing rates among voting neurons ({1
or 1), and by capturing categorization error directly (1{p). This
distillation transforms the detailed model into what can be character-
ized as an augmented quincunx, that is to say, an augmented version of
Sir Francis Galton’s original probability device. Although simple, the AQ
model captures the probabilistic relation between our inferences about
how unusual situations are (et) and what actually is (t), which is argued
to originate from an uncertain cognitive process of categorizing
information contained in cues (C). In the AQ model, rows of pegs
represent cues, while balls falling through the system into one of
various compartments represent the probabilistic categorization of
these cues. The true value is computed by the distinct path taken by an
attractor ball around pegs in the correct way.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.g003
Systematic Error in the Wisdom of Crowds
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not only confronted an ox with exceptional weight, but possessed
neurons capable of categorizing the associated cues adeptly.
Indeed, since the denominator of skew equation (27) is positive for
all permitted values of C, and since 2p{1 is positive for all
relevant values of p, we can hypothesize judges were not just
confronted with an exceptional ox broadly speaking, but were
confronted with an exceptionally heavy ox. This hypothesis is
made considering the negative skew reported by Galton, and
noting skew(et)v0 only when tw0. According to the AQ model,
had the ox been exceptionally light, then Galton would probably
have oberved positive skew.
Prediction 2: There is Systematic Error in the Wisdom of
Crowds
The AQ model predicts systematic error in the wisdom of
crowds. To see this, first subtract the mean judgment equation (8)
from t to get the expression for collective error:
CE~t{(2p{1)t, ð28Þ
Now set CE~0 and solve for t and p. This provides the
conditions where the wisdom of crowds is perfect, which it is when
p~1 or t~0. In words, the wisdom of crowds is infallible when
neurons of judges make no categorization errors, or when the true
value is typical, or both. Conversely, collective error is predicted
when the true value is extreme and neurons categorize cues
imperfectly under that condition.
The condition p~1 is simple to understand, because when
every person makes the judgment et~t, then the mean judgment
equation (25) equals t, and equation (28) becomes 0. In
comparison, the condition t~0 is more involved, because
understanding why the wisdom of crowds can sometimes be
perfect, even though neurons categorize cues arbitrarily, and why
sometimes arbitrary categorization is the direct cause of collective
error, can seem strange.
But consider the level of the individual and the probability of
making various judgments, as captured by distribution equation
(8). More specifically, consider in turn the two possible cases t=0
and t~0. When t=0 the stream of perceived information broadly
agrees in the sense total evidence for the hypothesis tw0 (or tv0)
surpasses the alternative. The implication is that miscategorization
of any cue supporting the correct hypothesis is more costly,
because to compensate other neurons would need to miscategor-
ize, in equal proportion, cues supporting the alternative. But these
cues are rarer when t=0. Indeed, in the most extreme case there is
no tolerance for miscategorization, because there are no conflict-
ing cues.
In contrast, when t~0 the neurons can, in principle, be exactly
wrong about every cue and still cause a perfect judgment about t,
because the weight of evidence for tw0 equals the weight of
evidence for tv0. More generally, the cost of miscategorization is
smallest when t~0 because here the probability of cancelling
mistakes by chance is greatest. Furthermore, when the true value is
typical, the probability is identical irrespective of the direction of
miscategorization, which is untrue when the true value is extreme.
Moving to the collective level again, these observations are
important because they affect the probability that judgments made
by many people will scatter in symmetry around the truth, and
consequently the likelihood of an errorless crowd. When t~0 the
judgment distribution tends to be symmetric for all crowds of
fallible people (p=1), but when t=0 more than half the
judgments tend to be smaller than t (Figure 4). Moreover, the
degree to which smaller judgments outweigh larger judgments
increases as t grows, and as p approaches 0:5. As corollary, to
counter the rising effect on collective error of greater extremeness,
p must rise, and for this reason individual adeptness is predicted to
be important for collective intelligence in extreme situations, but
not under typical circumstances.
Prediction 3: The Power of Diversity is Absent
One of the most common perceptions about the wisdom of
crowds is that more predictive diversity leads to greater collective
intelligence. We can use the appealing diversity prediction theorem
introduced by Page [6] to examine if the AQ model agrees. The
theorem is as follows:
CE2~AIE{var(et), ð29Þ
where AIE denotes average individual error. The message
provided by diversity prediction theorm (8) is simple: holding
average individual error constant, collective error will decrease if
judgment variance is raised; apparently there are benefits to
forming collectives whose members view the world as differently as
possible.
But the problem with the diversity prediction theorem is equally
plain. While (8) is an identity, and therefore always holds
mathematically, it places no restriction on the actual relationship
between AIE and var(et), except that AIEw~var(et). In other
words, diversity might increase to compensate, or even overcom-
pensate for greater average individual error in reality, or it might
not. The diversity prediction theorem may hold either way, and
cannot be used in isolation to predict if diversity actually has the
effect so often bestowed upon it [6][12]. The AQ model, however,
is clear on this matter: the power of diversity is absent.
To see why, start by isolating AIE in (13) using (9) and (11) to
get:
AIE~4(1{p) t2(1{p)zCp
 
: ð30Þ
Now differentiate equation (30) with respect to p, C and t to see
how AIE changes with these variables, and differentiate variance
equation (26) with respect to p and C to see how var(et) is affected;
the relative movement of var(et) and AIE is what we must
understand:
dAIE
dp
~C(4{8p){8t2(1{p), ð31Þ
dAIE
dC
~4(1{p)p, ð32Þ
dAIE
dt
~8t(1{p)2, ð33Þ
dvar(e)
dp
~C(4{8p), ð34Þ
and
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dvar(e)
dC
~4(1{p)p: ð35Þ
Numerous observations can be made from equation (31) to
equation (35). First, notice that when 0:5ƒpƒ1, then
8t2(1{p)§0 in equation (31) and C(4{8p)ƒ0 in equation (31)
and equation (34). Increasing p therefore never raises average
individual error, nor does it ever increase the variance of
judgments. Indeed, for all permitted values of p=0, average
individual error and variance both increase when p decreases,
implying strictly positive association.
Second, from equation (31) and equation (34) we notice that any
rise in judgment variance, produced by decreasing p, is never
larger than the simultaneous rise in average individual error,
implying collective error can never decrease from this effect. In
other words, diversity never has positive consequence for collective
error overall.
Third, the increase in diversity arising from greater numbers of
cues, as indicated by equation (35), equals the simultaneous
increase in average individual error indicated by equation (32),
thereby cancelling the effect of raising diversity again. Finally, the
rise in average individual error occurring when DtD rises above 0 in
equation (33) is not accompanied by any alleviating effect of
greater diversity, because judgment variance is not predicted to
change with extremeness. In short, according to the AQ model,
diversity has no power to increase collective intelligence overall.
On the contrary, crowds producing less predictive diversity are
predicted to be wiser.
Figure 4. Judgment distributions formed by different crowds in typical and extreme situations. According to the AQ model, true value
extremeness has no behavioral effect when crowds consists of judges whose neurons categorize cues arbitrarily (p~0:5). Novices cannot discriminate
the true value from what is typical, and the central tendency of judgments becomes the typical value. On the other hand, adept judges (p~0:95 in
this example) categorize information better than chance, and adjust their inference about the true value in the direction of its extremeness. However,
the adjustment of individual judgments, and the adjustment of the mean, will generally be incomplete, because any miscategorization will with
increasing probability move the evolving inference in the direction of the ordinary when the true value becomes more extreme. The reason is that
cues pointing towards the ordinary become increasingly uncommon and therefore unlikely to be miscategorized, something required to counter the
effect of miscategorizing more common cues pointing towards the extreme. On the other hand, under typical circumstances the situation is
inherently fortuitous, because the true value really is typical, making the mean of judgments perfect. This is true for both novices and experts,
because the probability of miscategorization is symmetric. However, the variance of expert judgment is smaller, and so are average individual errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.g004
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Prediction 4: Judgment Distributions are Cues for
Collective Intelligence
The AQ model predicts that when neurons categorize cues
imperfectly, but not arbitrarily (0:5vpv1), then collective error is
negatively correlated with judgment distribution skew. Under this
condition, and when the true value is atypically small (tv0), then
judgment distribution skew is positive (skew(et)w0) and collective
error is negative (CEv0), while the opposite occurs when the true
value is atypically large (tw0).
Collective error is not predicted to cause judgment distribution
skew, nor is skew predicted to cause collective error. Rather, both
are caused by the presence of an extreme true value, combined
with better than chance categorization of cues by neurons of
judges. To see this, consider the situation where every cue points
towards the same conclusion. Here perfect judgment by the crowd
demands perfect categorization by every neuron of every judge,
because otherwise the mean judgment will overestimate the truth
when tv0, and underestimate the truth when tw0.
However, while some neurons categorize accurately, others will,
by chance and fallibility, categorize imperfectly, creating collective
error and judgment distribution asymmetry simultaneously. As
corollary, because skew is observable, it can be used to foretell
collective error.
Materials and Methods
With the aim of testing predictions of the AQ model, I gathered
3053 publicly available judgment distributions from The Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters
(FRBP), and The Wall Street Journal’s Economic Forecasting
Survey (WSJ). Distributions came from six datasets (Table 1),
three from each source, and concern official measures of the US
economy. From WSJ these measures were consumer price
inflation (Data S1), GDP (Data S2), and unemployment (Data
S3), while measures from FRBP were housing starts (Data S4),
nominal GDP (NGDP) (Data S5), and unemployment (Data S6).
Participants in each survey were economists. Surveys by FRBP
are conducted quarterly, with participants required to respond
midway through each focus quarter; the surveys I used were those
available since initiation in 1969 until 2011. In comparison, the
surveys by WSJ are conducted monthly, with participants required
to respond during the first week of the focus month. Here I used
available surveys since initiation in 2004 until 2011.
For the purpose of testing the AQ model, judgment data has to
meet three important criteria. First, sufficient numbers of
individuals must participate in each survey to provide reliable
estimates of judgment distribution moments. Since 36 to 37
economists participated in each FRBP survey on average, while 54
to 55 economists participated on average in surveys from WSJ, the
chosen data met this yardstick satisfactorily. Second, the forecast-
ing methods applied by participants must involve intuition, since
the AQ model is about that process. Based on information
provided by Stark [13], an estimated 96 percent of FRBP
economists apply intuition when forecasting, and I had no reason
to suspect that participants surveyed by WSJ were different.
Finally, participants must be adept judges, since the AQ model
predicts that judgment distribution skew only occurs when neurons
categorize cues better than chance. Since participants in all
surveys are select economists, this criterion was also satisfied.
Each hypothesis was tested by calculating the Pearson
correlation coefficient between variables in question, and observ-
ing levels of significance. One-sided tests were applied throughout,
except for H7, where no correlation is predicted by the AQ model.
Effect sizes based on Cohen’s [14] classification were also
reported.
Variables
All variables except p and C were measurable from the gathered
judgment distributions, and from publicly available data on
realized economic figures. The expert status of surveyed econo-
mists, however, naturally separated the range of p from those
equal to 0:5, the latter being associated with judges who use
information arbitrarily. In other words, I could be quite certain my
analysis would say little about judgment distributions formed by
novices. Moreover, the inability to measure C prevented me from
testing the predicted effects of cue numerosity. The remaining
variables, however, were operationalized as follows:
Mean of judgments: mean(eT )i~
1
Ni
XNi
ji~1
eTji , where i
denotes the particular survey, ji denotes the individual participant
in survey i, Ni denotes the number of participants in survey i, and
eTji denotes the judgment submitted by participant ji.
Variance of judgments: var(eT )i~
1
Ni
XNi
ji~1
(eji{
mean(eT )i)
2.
Skew of judgments: skew(eT )i~
1
Ni
XNi
j~1
(eTji{
mean(eT )i)
3=(var(eT )i)
3=2.
Table 1. Surveys of Expectations.
Source Survey Period Frequency
The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (FRBP) Nominal GDP 1969 to 2010 Quarterly
Unemployment 1969 to 2010 Quarterly
Housing Starts 1969 to 2011 Quarterly
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) GDP 2004 to 2011 Monthly
Unemployment 2004 to 2011 Monthly
Inflation 2004 to 2011 Monthly
Data was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Surveys of Professional Forecasters, and the Wall Street Journal’s Economic Forecasting Survey.
Judgments from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia about nominal GDP and housing starts concern annual percentage growth in seasonally adjusted values,
while judgments about unemployment concern seasonally adjusted workforce percentages. Judgments from the Wall Street Journal also concern annual percentage
growth, except for unemployment, which concerns percentages of the workforce. All judgments concern the US macroeconomic system.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.t001
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Average individual error: AIEi~
1
Ni
XNi
ji~1
(Ti{eTji )
2,
where Ti denotes the realized economic value in question for
the particular survey.
Collective error: CEi = mean(eT )i{hi. Note that CE
2
i is
applied in H6 below.
Extremeness: ti~(Ti{m)=s, where m is the mean of true
values across all surveys,
1
n
Xn
i~1
Ti, and where s is the standard
deviation of true values across these surveys,
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
n
Xn
i~1
(Ti{m)
2
r
.
Hypotheses
The status of economists as adept creates the lower bound
pw0:5, while the upper bound pv1 is created by the complexity
of macroeconomic systems, combined with the fallibility of human
judgment generally. Based on these constraints, the tested
predictions of the AQ model were those listed below, with values
in brackets indicating the corresponding mathematical expressions
presented earlier:
H1: Judgment distributions have greater negative (positive)
skew when prevailing true values are progressively large (small)
compared to average (26).
H2: The mean of judgment distributions increasingly underes-
timates (overestimates) prevailing true values that are progressively
large (small) compared to average (25)(28).
H3: Average individual error is greater when prevailing true
values are progressively more extreme compared to average (30).
H4: Judgment distributions have greater negative (positive)
skew when the mean of judgments underestimates (overestimates)
the prevailing true value by greater margin (25)(27)(28).
H5: Greater judgment variance is associated with greater
average individual error (31)–(34).
H6: Greater judgment variance is associated with greater
collective error squared (31)–(34).
H7: There is no association between judgment distribution
variance and how extreme the prevailing true value is compared to
average (26).
Results
Evidence supports the AQ model well. For visual evidence,
please refer to Figure 5 for the case of judgments about US GDP
Figure 5. Empirical patterns of judgments about US GDP and unemployment. This figure shows associations between judgment
distribution skew, collective error, and extremeness of US GDP and unemployment, compared to what is typical for these variables (solid green line).
Judgments were made by economists about the annual seasonally adjusted growth of US nominal GDP, and the rate of seasonally adjusted US
unemployment, as obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted quarterly by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.g005
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and unemployment from FRBP, Figure 6 for the case of housing
starts and inflation collected from FRBP and WSJ respectively,
and Figure 7 for the case of judgments about US GDP and
unemployment from WSJ. In 5 of 6 data sets the skew of
judgments correlated negatively with extremeness (H1, Table 2).
Moreover, collective error correlated positively with extremeness
in all data sets (H2, Table 3), as did average individual errors in 5
of 6 cases (H3, Table 4). Hence individual economists and groups
of economists generally overestimated situations where measures
of the US economy were smaller than their historic levels, while
they underestimated when measures were larger. Moreover, in all
cases the skew of judgments correlated negatively with collective
error, although signs were significant in only 3 cases (H4, Table 5).
Results were also clear on the issue of diversity. In all data sets,
greater variance of judgments was positively correlated with
average individual error (H5, Table 6). Moreover, when variance
was greater, the associated average individual error rose in greater
proportion, leading to negative correlation between collective
error and judgment variance (H6, Table 7). In other words,
observations of greater diversity were generally accompanied by
observations of smaller collective intelligence. These findings are
all consistent with the AQ model, but the final result is not: in 5 of
6 data sets the variance of judgments made by economists was
found to be greater when economic measures were more extreme
(H7, Table 8). In comparison, the AQ model predicts that
judgment variance and extremeness are independent. For visual
evidence, please refer to Figure 5, 6 and 7. Figure 5 concerns
judgments about US GDP and unemployment obtained from
FRBP, Figure 6 concerns judgments about US housing and
inflation obtained from FRBP and WSJ respectively, while Figure
7 concerns judgments about US GDP and unemployment
obtained by WSJ.
Discussion
I introduced and tested the augmented quincunx (AQ) model of
probabilistic cue categorization by neurons of judges. My purpose
was to discover if the scatter of intuitive judgments made by many
different people can be predicted from the way neurons generate
inferences about the environment, and to discover if the mean of
judgments systematically deviates from the truth.
In the process of developing inferences about true values, when
neurons categorize cues better than chance, and when the
particular true value is extreme compared to what is typical and
Figure 6. Empirical patterns of judgments about US housing starts and inflation. This figure shows associations between judgment
distribution skew, collective error, and extremeness of US housing starts and consumer inflation, compared to what is typical for these variables (solid
green line). Judgments in the left column were made by economists about the annual seasonally adjusted growth of US housing starts, as obtained
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Judgments in the right column were made by
economists about the annual rate of US consumer price inflation, as obtained from the Economic Forecasting Survey conducted monthly by the Wall
Street Journal.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.g006
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anchored upon by individual judges, then skewed judgment
distributions will emerge with high probability according to the
AQ model. Moreover, according to the AQ model, collective error
can be inferred from the degree and direction of judgment
distribution skew, and from judgment distribution variance,
implying not just that judgment distributions are shaped by cues,
but that judgment distributions are cues themselves for collective
intelligence.
Using 3053 distributions of judgments about the US economy
formed by leading economists, I found evidence supporting the
AQ model. These findings suggest that trust in the wisdom of
crowds should be moderated by considering the adeptness of
people in the crowd, and by the particular way their judgments are
observed to scatter.
Figure 7. Empirical patterns of judgments about US GDP and unemployment. Shown are associations between judgment distribution
skew, collective error, and extremeness of US GDP and unemployment compared to what is typical for these variables (solid green line). Judgments
were made by economists about the annual growth of US GDP, and the rate of US unemployment, as obtained from the Economic Forecasting
Survey conducted monthly by the Wall Street Journal.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.g007
Table 2. Testing H1: Negative association between t and skew(eT ).
Source Survey Correlation Significance (1-tail) Effect Size Sign N
FRBP Nominal GDP 20.180*** 0.000 Small Correct 809
Housing Starts 20.078* 0.013 Small Correct 818
Unemployment 0.004 0.453 Incorrect 819
WSJ GDP 20.281*** 0.000 Small Correct 287
Inflation 20.261*** 0.000 Small Correct 161
Unemployment 20.285*** 0.000 Small Correct 159
Evidence suggests that atypically large true values are associated with judgment distributions that have greater negative skew. The reverse holds for atypically small
true values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.t002
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Galton’s Conjecture on the Distribution of Judgments
Three important ideas are affected by this paper. The first is
Galton’s conjecture on the distribution of judgments, which
Galton expressed in his seminal paper on the wisdom of crowds
from 1907 [1]. The ‘‘curious anomaly’’ of the skewed judgment
distributions, which Galton observed at the West of England Fat
Stock and Poultry Exhibition, was thought to be caused by small
varieties of different formulae among those who competed to guess
the weight of an exhibited ox. The AQ model, and the presented
evidence, agrees to some extent with Galton, because smaller
judgment variance and greater judgment skew are predicted to
occur often and together when people in the crowd are experts.
Now, we know Galton believed judges were ordinary people,
but the opposing view of English botanist Perry-Coste must be
considered [15]. After Galton’s seminal article appeared in
Nature, Perry-Coste argued with conviction to Norman Lockyer,
the founding editor of Nature, that Galton had not been exposed
to Vox Populi, as the title of his article indicates he believed, but
Vox Expertorum. Judges were, so Perry-Coste argued, butchers
and farmers whose livelihood depended on their ability to appraise
the weight of farm animals before trading, and it appears to be an
excellent point.
But Galton also missed another effect, namely interaction
between judge adeptness and environmental extremeness; skewed
judgment distributions are rare even when judges are expert,
unless the subject of judgment deviates from the central tendency
of prior experience.
Of course, we can only speculate about the famous ox; we know
its weight, but no information was provided by Galton about its
breed. All we know is that Galton described it as being ‘‘fat’’.
Nevertheless, my recent correspondence with Professor Van
Vleck, an esteemed cattle geneticist, combined with evidence
provided by McMurry [16] of Cargill Animal Nutrition, suggest
judges in Plymouth were indeed presented with an exceptionally
heavy specimen. According to Van Vleck, a contemporary male
ox kept until maturity can reasonably weigh 2000 lb, while its
dressed weight often lies in the vicinity reported by Galton.
However, the situation was different back then. Due to
crossbreeding, improvements in health programs, and improve-
ments in nutrition programs, mature sizes have grown. Indeed,
according to McMurry, the average bull carcass has become 30
percent heavier in the last 30 years alone. Therefore, while we
cannot be sure about the particular breed, there is good reason to
believe judges were presented with an exceptionally heavy ox. And
this is important, because that direction of extremeness, combined
with Galton’s observation of negative skew and underestimation
by the mean, creates circumstances exactly consistent with those
the AQ model predicts.
Muth’s Rational Expectations Hypothesis
The second important idea affected by the present paper is
Muth’s rational expectations hypothesis from 1961 [4][5]. Muth
was right, the mean of judgments often does perform well.
Nevertheless, the content of the present paper suggests the mean
judgment is rational on average only, because in the particular it
systematically errors depending on individual expertise and the
extremeness of what is being judged.
Muth supported his assumption of rationality by noting
empirical observations made by Heady and Kaldor about farmer
judgments [2]. These researchers had investigated judgments
about agricultural prices during 1948 and 1949, and had
discovered that mean judgments across the 168 to 176 surveyed
farmers corresponded to eventual prices well. What Muth did not
disclose, however, but what Heady and Kaldor had made clear,
Table 3. Testing H2: Positive association between t and CE.
Source Survey Correlation Significance (1-tail) Effect Size Sign N
FRBP Nominal GDP 0.785*** 0.000 Large Correct 809
Housing Starts 0.742*** 0.000 Large Correct 818
Unemployment 0.426*** 0.000 Medium Correct 819
WSJ GDP 0.900*** 0.000 Large Correct 287
Inflation 0.173* 0.015 Small Correct 161
Unemployment 0.840*** 0.000 Large Correct 159
Evidence strongly suggests that atypically large true values are associated with positive collective error, or alternatively, that collectives underestimate atypically large
true values. The reverse occurs for atypically small true values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.t003
Table 4. Testing H4: Positive association between AIE and DtD.
Source Survey Correlation Significance (1-tail) Effect Size Sign N
FRBP Nominal GDP 0.312*** 0.000 Medium Correct 809
Housing Starts 0.620*** 0.000 Large Correct 818
Unemployment 0.355*** 0.000 Medium Correct 819
WSJ GDP 0.766*** 0.000 Large Correct 287
Inflation 0.617** 0.001 Large Correct 161
Unemployment 20.035 0.331 Incorrect 159
Evidence suggests that average individual error is greater when true values are more extreme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.t004
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was that 3 of 4 examined judgment distributions were noticeably
skewed, while the last distribution was ‘‘nearly normal’’. More
precisely, all distributions were more or less positively skewed, and
their mean overestimated actual prices in 3 of 4 cases by 8 to 27
percent, while the actual price was underestimated by 1 percent in
the final case. Given the present paper we recognize these
observations as consistent with predictions of systematic error in
the wisdom of crowds, and thereby systematic violation of Muth’s
influential assumption about collective intelligence.
Page’s Diversity Prediction Theorem
The final idea affected by the content of the present paper is the
power of diversity to reduce collective error, as argued by Page
using his diversity prediction theorem [6]. While transition from
individual, to group, and finally to crowd, will involve the
introduction of predictive diversity whenever people are fallible,
and while such diversity will introduce collective intelligence, it
should not be concluded in haste that introducing greater diversity
to already established crowds is beneficial too. Indeed, from the
practical perspective of assembling collectives, the designer must
be careful to separate the beneficial effects of increasing the
number of collective members, from the costly effects of
introducing individuals to crowds who are less adept than average.
Weaknesses and Strengths
At this point an apparent weakness must be stated, which limits
the scope of supported conclusions about diversity. I wrote the
above to coincide with the predictions and findings presented, but
the logic of the AQ model leads to the idea that diversity can,
contrary to predictions under the chosen assumptions, be
positively associated with p, and that increasing the diversity of
crowds can be beneficial sometimes after all. I have throughout
assumed homogeneity in the probability of categorization error,
but let us consider a situation where homogeneous novices are
joined by experts, creating an assortment of p in the collective.
Furthermore, let us assume this event happens under extreme
circumstances.
Before the experts arrived, collective error would be quite
substantial (revisit Figure 3), but two things now happen. First, the
mean judgment moves farther away from the typical value and
closer towards the truth, driven by smaller individual errors among
the newcomers. Second, the variance of judgments increases. In
other words, contrary to predictions under the assumption of
homogeneity, there is reason to suspect introducing more diversity
can be positive, if the increase in diversity is caused by adept
newcomers, and if the situation is extreme.
Yet the assumption of homogeneity appears to generate another
weakness too, namely the discovered inability to explain why
predictive diversity correlates positively with extremeness (revisit
Table 8). To see this, let us continue our story and let us assume
the new collection of heterogeneous judges must now evaluate
numerous true values in succession. Under typical circumstances
the distribution of judgments will centre on the truth, with
variance determined mainly by errors among the incumbents. But
as the true value becomes more extreme, the combined behaviour
of experts and novices becomes pivotal. Judges whose neurons
categorize cues arbitrarily will be unresponsive to how extreme the
true value is, while adept judges will form judgments moving with
the truth. In other words, for the entire collective of heterogeneous
judges the spread of judgments increases with extremeness, and
the inconsistencies shown in Table 8 are thereby explained. In
passing, note that skew is amplified during this process by the
combination of unresponsive novices, and experts tuned to
developments. Indeed, using the application supplied in Applica-
tion S1, the reader can verify these claims.
Table 5. Testing H3: Negative association between skew(eT ) and CE.
Source Survey Correlation Significance (1-tail) Effect Size Sign N
FRBP Nominal GDP 20.111** 0.001 Small Correct 809
Housing Starts 20.011 0.376 Correct 818
Unemployment 20.027 0.217 Correct 819
WSJ GDP 20.163** 0.003 Small Correct 287
Inflation 20.011 0.445 Correct 161
Unemployment 20.372*** 0.000 Medium Correct 159
Evidence mildly suggests that negatively skewed judgment distributions are associated with positive collective error, or alternatively, that negative skew of the
judgment distribution signals underestimation by the collective. The reverse occurs for positively skewed distributions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.t005
Table 6. Testing H5: Positive association between AIE and var(eT).
Source Survey Correlation Significance (1-tail) Effect Size Sign N
FRBP Nominal GDP 0.343*** 0.000 Medium Correct 809
Housing Starts 0.482*** 0.000 Medium Correct 818
Unemployment 0.340*** 0.000 Medium Correct 819
WSJ GDP 0.269*** 0.000 Small Correct 287
Ination 0.249** 0.001 Small Correct 161
Unemployment 0.612*** 0.000 Large Correct 159
Evidence strongly suggests that greater judgment variance is associated with greater average individual error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.t006
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Meanwhile, other assumptions can also be debated. First, there
is the assumption individuals form judgments by using the central
tendency of prior experience as their initial thought, and adjust
away from this anchor as unusual information is received. An
alternative approach would be to assume individuals anchor at
zero, and adjust their inference up or down by the full information
value of categorized cues, as is common when judgments are
modeled using regression [17][18]. Either way, reference point
logic is applied in ways consistent with neurons accumulating
discrete evidence sequentially and probabilistically, but only the
chosen approach is consistent with established ideas on self-
generated anchoring [19]. Indeed, the chosen assumption leads to
conclusions relevant for research on the anchoring heuristic, by
providing an explanation for the phenomenon of incomplete
adjustment [20].
Second, the assumption individuals have generated identical
anchors appears unrealistic for novices with little experience, but
for individuals with substantial experience working on the same
problem, the assumption appears unproblematic. Indeed, sub-
stantial reference point diversity among experts would need
explaining.
Third, in reality many aspects of the environment contain
redundant information, because they are not independent of other
aspects. I have assumed stochastically independent cues, which
may, from that perspective, be considered wrong. However, while
many aspects of the environment correlate, most correlate
imperfectly, which implies that despite carrying some redundant
information, not all information carried by dependent aspects is
superfluous. Indeed, the assumption of stochastically independent
cues can be viewed as an assumption of modularity in the
environment, with cues being defined as these modules. Within
modules there is correlation between different elements, while
between modules little correlation exists.
Fourth, the discrete nature of the modeled probabilistic process
leads to discrete judgment distributions unless neurons categorize
many cues, while more continuous distributions usually arise in
reality, even when judges process little information. This, however,
is an inconsistency diminished simply by introducing exogenous
noise, as is common when judgments are modeled using
regression. Alternatively, the assumption that only two competing
voting neurons are activated by the particular cue can be eased to
create tuning curves[21]–[25]. Now polling neurons adjacent to
the one with greatest mean response might by chance demonstrate
greatest activity, thereby decoupling information value from
encoded evidence in random fashion. Whatever approach is
taken, however, predictions will be unaffected unless noise
removes all neural correlates of information.
Finally, the introduced model appears confined to non-social
processes, since the judgments made by different individuals are
assumed to be independent draws from the same probabilistic
process. Nevertheless, this observation is only true in part, because
no assumptions are made about cues being communicated socially
or not. What is not captured, however, is the display of misleading
cues, or the use of social influence to affect how others categorize
cues. Moreover, any effect that limits access to cues, such as social
networks, is not captured either.
Nonetheless, despite forces undoubtedly being unrepresented in
my argument, the AQ model does an excellent job predicting and
explaining the phenomenon it was constructed to help us
understand. Moreover, it does so, after all, with higher levels of
realism than common least square models of intuitive judgment
[29]. Indeed, from the perspective of cue learning psychology, the
introduced model is consistent with Brunswik’s [26][27][28] ideas
Table 7. Testing H6: Positive association between CE2 and var(eT).
Source Survey Correlation Significance (1-tail) Effect Size Sign N
FRBP Nominal GDP 0.304*** 0.000 Medium Correct 809
Housing Starts 0.424*** 0.000 Medium Correct 818
Unemployment 0.190*** 0.000 Small Correct 819
WSJ GDP 0.193** 0.001 Small Correct 287
Ination 0.174* 0.014 Small Correct 161
Unemployment 0.804*** 0.000 Large Correct 159
Evidence strongly suggests that greater judgment variance is associated with greater collective error squared.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.t007
Table 8. Testing H7: No association between var(eT) and DtD.
Source Survey Correlation Significance (2-tail) Effect Sign N
FRBP Nominal GDP 0.201*** 0.000 Small Inconsistent 809
Housing Starts 0.279*** 0.000 Small Inconsistent 818
Unemployment 0.264*** 0.000 Small Inconsistent 819
WSJ GDP 0.392*** 0.000 Medium Inconsistent 287
Ination 0.157* 0.046 Small Inconsistent 161
Unemployment 0.117 0.142 Consistent 159
Evidence suggests that judgment variance is greater when the true value is more extreme. These patterns are, unlike the patterns presented in Table 2 - Table 7,
inconsistent with predictions of the AQ model under the applied assumptions. The discussion section includes an explanation of why these patterns may occur using
AQ model logic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112386.t008
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on probabilistic functionalism, and predicts that Brunswik’s most
basic subject of study, namely the adjustment of the organism to
the environment, is observable from the shape of judgment
distributions formed by many facing this problem of cognitive
adaptation.
In short, the results I have presented link neuroscience to the
social realm in ways consistent with cue learning psychology. As
people struggle to adjust to their environment, neurons in the
brain encode information mediated by the environment to
generate phenomena observable not just from the individual, that
is to say, from the intuitive judgments people make, but from the
crowd, that is to say, from the distribution of judgments made by
many different people. That discovery is significant because it
moves scientists across these fields closer to understanding the
success and failure of information processing entities at multiple
levels of aggregation, from individual neurons to entire human
organizations.
Future Research
Future research on systematic error in the wisdom of crowds will
likely be done using massive data sets of judgments, using
controlled laboratory settings, or ideally, using controlled settings
generating massive data. In the immediate future it remains to be
examined if cue numerosity really does increase both diversity and
average individual error, and if skewed judgment distributions are
formed less frequently by novices as predicted. These examina-
tions hold the promise of improving our confidence in the specific
probabilistic representation depicted by the AQ model. Such
confidence would be particularly boosted, however, if predictions
about skew, collective error, and extremeness, were also demon-
strated to hold for the crowd within [30][31][32]. At that point
what promises to be the most rewarding continuation could then
be initiated, namely cue learning experiments among crowds of
participants, where algorithms extract relationships between
collective error and judgment distribution skew in real-time, for
the purpose of correcting mistakes before they occur in said
laboratories, and beyond.
Meanwhile, however, the robustness of candidate procedures
can already be tested through bootstrapping on existing data sets
of substantial size. Indeed, the most obvious candidate process
involves merely three parameters: 1) the number of judgment
distributions used to linearly estimate the association between
collective error and skew, 2) the number of judges used to form
these distributions, and 3) the number of judges used to generate
the cue for collective error on the next task. Within the constraint
of each particular setting, random batches of judges and tasks
would be sampled to discover the average error of the skew-
adjusted mean, and the variance of this error, so comparisons can
be made with errors generated by the wisdom of the crowds, as
measured by the arithmetic mean, or the median of judgments.
Conclusion
Every day is filled with decisions based on intuitive judgments.
When doctors diagnose patients, their intuitive judgments affect
the choice of treatment and the patient’s subsequent chance of
recovery. When managers assess company performance, their
intuitive judgments affect jobs and the economic livelihood of
workers. And when individuals vote for politicians, their decision is
based on intuitive judgments about how well the politician will
perform in office, with the prosperity of entire nations sometimes
at stake. We have long known that harnessing the wisdom of
crowds can help us reduce the extent of our individual errors, yet
what the present paper indicates is that our trust in popular
judgment should have limits, because there is systematic error in
our collective intelligence, emerging from the way our neurons
categorize information contained in the cues we use. But as with
all previous discoveries of judgment biases, now we know, we are
positioned to do something about it.
Supporting Information
Application S1 Zipped Java application that readers can
use to become familiar with the AQ Model, and discover
what predictions it makes about judgment distributions
and collective error. The application is accompanied by
further instructions.
(ZIP)
Code S1 Zipped MATLAB code for simulating many
judgment competitions of the kind observed by Sir
Francis Galton in 1906. Judgments made by each competitor
derive from the modeled behaviour of their neurons. Readers may
toggle between Gaussian or Poisson distributed neuronal firing,
and may also examine the effect of firing rate variance on the
character of the judgment distribution that judges collectively
form.
(ZIP)
Data S1 Judgment data in Excel about US consumer
price inflation, gathered from The Wall Street Journal’s
Economic Forecasting Survey. Judgments concern annual
percentage growth. Surveys are conducted monthly by the journal.
(XLS)
Data S2 Judgment data in Excel about US GDP,
gathered from The Wall Street Journal’s Economic
Forecasting Survey. Judgments concern annual percentage
growth. Surveys are conducted monthly by the journal.
(XLS)
Data S3 Judgment data in Excel about US Unemploy-
ment, gathered from The Wall Street Journal’s Econom-
ic Forecasting Survey. Judgments concern percentage of the
workforce. Surveys are conducted monthly by the journal.
(XLS)
Data S4 Judgment data in Excel about US housing
starts, gathered from The Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. Judg-
ments concern annual percentage growth in seasonally adjusted
values. Surveys are conducted quarterly by the bank.
(XLS)
Data S5 Judgment data in Excel about US nominal
GDP, gathered from The Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. Judg-
ments concern annual percentage growth in seasonally adjusted
values. Surveys are conducted quarterly by the bank.
(XLS)
Data S6 Judgment data in Excel about US unemploy-
ment, gathered from The Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters. Judg-
ments concern seasonally adjusted percentages of the workforce.
Surveys are conducted quarterly by the bank.
(XLS)
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